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INTRODUCTION
Butterfield Ford sold a defective van to the State of Utah. The van, a Ford
Econoline E350 fifteen-passenger van, was defective because of its propensity to roll
over. Barry Sanns, a State employee, was seriously injured when the van rolled over on
1-15. The trail court granted Butterfield Ford summary judgment, ruling that there was no
evidence that Butterfield Ford was negligent in its sale of the van and that Butterfield
Ford could not be liable in strict products liability because it did not design, manufacture,
test, label, service or modify the van—it just sold it.
The trial court was wrong on both counts. There was evidence from which a
reasonable jury could infer that Butterfield Ford failed to exercise reasonable care in
selling the van without adequate warnings of its propensity to roll over. On a motion for
summary judgment, the trial court was required to view the evidence in the light most
favorable to Mr. Sanns and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Butterfield Ford
fails to apply this standard to the facts of this case. There was sufficient evidence, viewed
in the light most favorable to Mr. Sanns, to support a finding that Butterfield Ford failed
to exercise reasonable care in its sale of the van. (See infra pt. I.)
The trial court also erred in holding that a passive retailer can no longer be liable in
strict products liability under Utah law. The Utah Liability Reform Act, UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 78-27-37 through -43, did not alter the substantive law of strict products liability
in Utah. In fact, it specifically recognized strict liability and products liability as viable
causes of action. It only altered how liability is apportioned in the case of multiple
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tortfeasors. That issue is not before this court, since there has been no finding of liability
yet. (See infra pt. II.)
The conclusion that the Liability Reform Act did not alter the strict products
liability of a so-called passive retailer is supported by the plain language of the act (pt.
II.A), its legislative history (pt. II.B), the relevant case law from Utah (pt. II.C) and other
jurisdictions (pt. II.D) and relevant policy considerations (pt. II.E).

ARGUMENT
L
THERE WAS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO
BUTTERFIELD FORD'S NEGLIGENCE IN SELLING
A DEFECTIVE VAN WITHOUT ADEQUATE WARNINGS.
On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court is required to view the facts in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (here, Mr. Sanns) and draw all reasonable
inferences in his favor. E.g., Frisbee v. K&K Constr. Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah
1984). Butterfield Ford pays lip service to this standard (Br. of Aplee. at 11) but ignores
its application to the facts of this case.
In his deposition, Brent Butterfield, the owner of Butterfield Ford, testified that, if
Butterfield Ford was aware of a safety problem with a vehicle, "[w]ithin the limits of our
ability to communicate we would issue those cautions . . .." (Record ("R.") 245.) Mr.
Butterfield also acknowledged that the Econoline E350 van "has a high roof; therefore, a
different center of gravity than a sports car. So obviously there is an awareness, for lack
2

of a better term, that it handles differently than a Mustang Cobra . . . . " (R. 232. See also
R. 236 ("It's tall and square. It's bound to have different [handling] characteristics than
the 911.").) He further assumed that his managers who review the vehicles and their
characteristics with purchasers would know about the stability of the E350 as compared
to the stability of passenger type vehicles. (R. 237.) According to Mr. Butterfield,
"There is now . . . , inside the vehicle on the visor there is a caution about what it is and
that it should be driven appropriately." (R. 232.) Whether that caution was on the van
Butterfield Ford sold to the State of Utah (Mr. Sanns's employer) is a genuine issue of
material fact.
There is also a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Butterfield Ford
adequately advised the State and Mr. Sanns of the caution. When asked whether a
Butterfield Ford employee points out the visor warning on the E350 van at the time the
retail purchaser picks it up, Mr. Butterfield responded, "Boy, the only straight answer to
that has got to be probably some yes and probably some no." (R. 239.)
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Sanns and drawing all
reasonable inferences in his favor, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Butterfield Ford adequately warned the State of Utah of the handling characteristics of the
van when it sold the van to the State.
Butterfield Ford tries to get around the existence of material issues of fact as to its
negligence by claiming that Mr. Sanns did not prove below that Butterfield Ford owed
him any duty of care. (Br. of Aplee. at 10.) That is because Butterfield Ford did not
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dispute below that it owed purchasers of its vehicles a duty of care. (See R. 30, 172-78,
300-02.) In fact, Mr. Butterfield testified, "If there is a safety problem that is known, we
are responsible, as is the factory . . ., and we would advise according to whatever
guidelines are set by whomever is in charge on that day, whether that's NHTSA, Ford."
(R. 245.)1 Moreover, Mr. Butterfield testified that it warned some purchasers of the E350
vans of their handling characteristics but not other purchasers.2
Butterfield Ford argues that, because the State was a fleet buyer, Butterfield Ford
had no duty to warn-that that duty "was assumed by the State." (Br. of Aplee. at 10.)
But the State can only warn its drivers of dangers it knows about. Butterfield Ford still

1

Nevertheless, for legal authority for the proposition that the seller of a
defective product owes users of the product a duty of care, see, e.g., Schaerrer v.
Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 2003 UT 43, ^ 19, 79 P.3d 922 (although sellers of
prescription drugs are protected from strict liability design defect claims, they have the
same duty as other product sellers "to warn of the risks associated with the use of their
products"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 401 (1963 & 1964) (a seller of a chattel
who knows or has reason to know it is or is likely to be dangerous when used by others
whom the seller should expect to share in or be endangered by its use can be liable if he
fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of the danger or otherwise protect them
against it).
2

For example, Mr. Butterfield testified that "we would caution someone
that's going to drive the vehicle to drive it appropriately." (R. 233.) When asked when
they would give this caution, Mr. Butterfield testified that it depended "on whether the
individual was a retail user or someone who's buying them professionally." (R. 233.) In
the case of a fleet purchaser, Butterfield Ford would deliver the owner's manual "and
instruct the purchaser about certain prohibitions. And that's the extent of it as far as
we're concerned regarding a fleet sale because we don't know who the driver will be."
(R. 233-34.) When asked what the manager who goes through the owner's manual with
the purchaser of an E350 van would say regarding its handling characteristics, Mr.
Butterfield testified, "Beyond the knowledge which their experience and expertise would
give them, I don't know what they might — I don't know what information they would
have regarding the handling characteristics of an E350." (R. 236.)
4

has a duty to warn fleet buyers of problems with the vehicles they purchase, and there
was no evidence here that Butterfield Ford warned the State.
Butterfield Ford also suggests that it had no duty to warn because the State was "a
sophisticated purchaser." (Id.) To avoid liability on the grounds that the injured user of a
product was a sophisticated user, Butterfield Ford had to show "that the 'ultimate user
possesses special knowledge, sophistication, or expertise' to such an extent that 'the
user's knowledge of the danger is equivalent to prior notice.'" House v. Armour of Am.,
Inc., 929 P.2d 340, 345 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). Butterfield Ford made no such
showing below. (SeeR. 30-45, 95-108, 171-206, 294-303.)
Finally, Butterfield Ford argues that the materials the plaintiff relied on to show
the defective nature of the van could not create any duty because they did not exist when
Butterfield Ford sold the van in question. Mr. Sanns does not claim that the materials
create a duty to warn. That duty has been assumed by Butterfield Ford and is imposed by
law. (See supra notes 1 and 2 and accompanying text.) Rather, Mr. Sanns has pointed to
the materials only to show how the van is defective (an issue that Butterfield Ford has not
disputed for purposes of its motion for summary judgment and this appeal) and to raise an
issue of fact as to whether Butterfield Ford should have known of the defective nature of
the van. Although Butterfield Ford obviously could not have warned of the NHTSA
research note (R. 247-58) or the NTSB safety recommendation (R. 259-63) before they
were issued, they were based on data from Utah and other states for the years preceding
Butterfield Ford's sale of the van in question. (See R. 248, 259.) Moreover, the materials
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indicated that there have been over seventy lawsuits involving rollovers of Ford
Econoline and Club Wagon fifteen-passenger vans. (R. 266.) Mr. Butterfield testified
that "we're all exposed to news articles, to small talk, to conversation." (R. 233.) He also
testified that, when he hears about a large lawsuit, he does not inquire to see what is
claimed in the case and does not ask Ford what the claims are. He said, "There may be
some information available in the press, but I don't seek it out." (R. 246.) A reasonable
jury could conclude from the evidence that Butterfield Ford should have known of safety
problems with E350 vans before it sold the van in 1999. Whether or not it should have
known was another genuine issue of material fact, making summary judgment
inappropriate.

IL
BUTTERFIELD FORD CAN BE LIABLE FOR
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY.
Even if there were no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Butterfield Ford
was negligent in selling a defective product without adequate warnings, it can still be
liable to Mr. Sanns under the doctrine of strict products liability. See Slisze v. StanleyBostitch, 1999 UT 20, ^ 8, 979 P.2d 317 (it is possible to bring both a negligence and a
strict liability claim against the same defendant). Butterfield Ford argues, however, and
the trial court agreed, that the Utah Liability Reform Act ("LRA") did away with strict
products liability for a passive retailer.
Butterfield Ford's argument is based on the following syllogism:
6

Major Premise: The LRA precludes recovery from any defendant who is not at
fault.
Minor Premise: A passive retailer (i.e., one who does nothing more than sell a
defective product) is not at fault.
Conclusion: Therefore, the LRA precludes recovery from a passive retailer.
The fallacy with this argument is that it is based on a play on words. The term
"fault" means different things in the major and minor premises. "Fault" within the
meaning of the LRA means "any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person seeking
recovery, including. . . strict liability [and] . . . products liability . . . ." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-27-37(2) (2002) (emphasis added). As Butterfield Ford uses the term in the
minor premise, "fault" means negligence. It may not be negligence, without more, to sell
a defective product without adequate warnings, but it can be an "actionable breach of
legal duty" under the doctrine of strict products liability. The LRA does not say what
breaches of legal duty are actionable. It leaves that question to other law.
Butterfield Ford acknowledges that the Utah Supreme Court adopted the doctrine
of strict products liability as stated in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
m Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979) (see Br. of
Aplee. at 13), and that, under this doctrine, a nonmanufacturing seller of a defective
product (such as Butterfield Ford) may be held strictly liable for harm caused by the
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product (Br. of Aplee. at 20).3 Instead, it argues that the LRA implicitly abolished section
402A for passive retailers because it abolished joint and several liability for tortfeasors
and actions for contribution and indemnification. This argument begs the question.
The threshold question is whether the law recognizes a cause of action against the
putative defendant. The LRA did not address that question but left it to be resolved by
other (preexisting) law. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(2) ("'Fault' means any
actionable breach of legal duty"). Only if the law recognizes liability does die court need
to reach the next question, which is how liability is to be apportioned where there is more
than one tortfeasor. Butterfield Ford's argument puts the cart before the horse.
Butterfield Ford assumes that, because the doctrines of joint and several liability,
implied indemnity and contribution applied to products liability actions before the LRA
was enacted (as they applied to all other tort actions)4 and because the LRA did away
3

The new Restatement does not do away with the strict products liability of a
passive retailer. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1, cmt e
(1997) ("all commercial sellers and distributors of products, including nonmanufacturing
sellers and distributors such as wholesalers and retailers, are subject to liability for selling
products that are defective . . . even when such nonmanufacturing sellers or distributors
do not themselves render the products defective and regardless of whether they are in a
position to prevent defects from occurring").
4

Butterfield Ford's description of prior products liability law suffers from the
same flaw as its logical argument. Butterfield Ford claims that, traditionally, a
nonmanufacturing seller "with zero liability" could be 100% liable for a plaintiffs
injuries. (Br. of Aplee. at 7. See also id. at 8, 14.) Butterfield Ford confuses 'liability"
and "fault" with negligence. A seller with no liability could not be jointly and severally
liable. A party can only be liable (whether jointly and severally or otherwise) if it did
something wrong, that is, if it breached a duty it owed to the plaintiff. Section 402A
describes the circumstances under which strict liability can be imposed on a product seller
under traditional products liability law, whether the seller was also the manufacturer or
not. The plaintiff is not arguing that merely asserting a claim for strict liability is enough
8

with these doctrines (at least in part),5 then the LRA did away with the strict liability of a

to establish "fault," as Butterfield Ford claims. (See Br. of Aplee. at 12.) The elements of
section 402A must still be met. But Butterfield Ford has not disputed any of those
elements in this case.
5

The precise extent to which the LRA did away with joint and several
liability and contribution is not clear. See, e.g., Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy,
Inc., 2003 UT 43,ffif8-10, 15, 37, 79 P.3d 922 (not reaching the defendant seller's
argument that, because it was "a downstream link in the chain of distribution," it was
entitled to indemnification from the product manufacturer); Nelson v. Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 935 P.2d 512, 515
(Utah 1997) (Howe, J., concurring) ("the LRA does not abolish, or even address, joint
and several liability in other contexts such as in respondeat superior"; the joint and
several liability of an employer and its employee "was not disturbed by the enactment of
the LRA," and to claim that the LRA "completely removed joint and several liability
'from Utah's tort scheme'" "sweeps too broadly"). But cf Bishop v. Gentec, Inc., 2002
UT 36,fflf10-13, 48 P.3d 218 (the LRA preempts the common law doctrine of respondeat
superior at least to the extent it would otherwise allow an injured employee's own
negligence to be imputed to his employer in an action for the employee's wrongful death).
Other courts have construed their comparative fault statutes to allow claims of implied
indemnity in cases of vicarious liability. See, e.g., Wiggs v. City of Phoenix, 10 P.3d 625,
629, \ 14 (Ariz. 2000). The strict products liability of a retailer of a defective product has
been recognized as a form of vicarious liability. See Wimberly v. Derby Cycle Corp., 65
Cal. Rptr. 2d 532, 535-41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 13 cmt. a ("Retailers and other
nonmanufacturer sellers of products may be held strictly liable for a defect attributable to
the manufacturer, in effect imposing vicarious liability on the retailer"); id. § 7 cmt. j ("an
innocent retailer and a manufacturer of a defective product are treated as a single entity").
As one court has explained:
[A] parallel exists between defendants in a product's chain of distribution
and defendants in a vicarious liability case. Much like the defendants
within the chain of distribution of a defective product, vicariously liable
defendants are viewed, for policy reasons, as a single entity. In both
situations, the policy of allocating losses to defendants for harm caused by
the defendants' joint enterprise justifies dispensing with the requirement
that plaintiffs prove the degree of fault of each individual defendant.
Arena v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 593 (Cal. Ct. App.),
review denied (Cal. 1998). Nevertheless, whether a seller and manufacturer can be jointly
and severally liable and whether the seller can seek indemnity from the manufacturer are
9

passive retailer. The LRA no more abolished strict products liability for a passive retailer
than it abolished liability for any other tortfeasor whose liability was previously governed
by principles of joint and several liability, contribution or indemnity. At most, it simply
changed the way in which liability is to be apportioned in the case of multiple
tortfeasors.6
Butterfield Ford cites no authority for its interpretation of the LRA, namely, that
the LRA did away with the strict products liability of a purely passive retailer under
certain circumstances. In fact, application of the general rules of statutory construction
and the relevant authority refute the argument.

issues that are not before this court at this time.
6

Butterfield Ford does not dispute that, if it were the only defendant, it could
be liable to Mr. Sanns. It limits its argument against strict liability for a passive
distributor of a product to cases "where the distributor did not participate in the design,
manufacture or testing of the product or prepare any labeling or warnings on the product,
and where these duties have been expressly assumed by the manufacturer who is a named
and participating defendant in the action. " (See Br. of Aplee. at 1 (emphasis added).)
The trial court similarly limited its holding. (See R. 327, ^| 3.) In other words, both
Butterfield Ford and the trial court implicitly recognize that the LRA does not immunize a
passive distributor from liability where the product manufacturer or designer is not a
named party to the action. Thus, Butterfield Ford is asking this court to read into the
LRA an exception to the general rule that the seller of a defective product may be liable
for injuries caused by the product, for cases where the manufacturer or designer is a
named party and participating in the action. Of course, exceptions to statutes are not
lightly implied: "[Wjhere the legislature has made no exception to the positive terms of a
statute, the presumption is that it intended to make none, and . . . it is a general rule of
construction that the courts have no authority to create, and will not created [sic],
exceptions to the provisions of a statute not made by the act itself." 73 AM. JUR. 2D
Statutes § 214, at 403 (2001) (footnote omitted). An exception to the provisions of a
statute that "is not suggested by any of its terms should not be introduced by construction
from considerations of mere convenience, equity, public welfare, justice, or hardship."
Id at 403-04 (footnotes omitted).
10

A-

The Plain Language of the LRA
In construing a statute such as the LRA, this court's primary goal is to give effect

to the legislative intent, as manifested by the plain language of the statute, in light of the
purpose the statute was meant to achieve. E.g., State v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation
Co., 2002 UT 75, % 13, 52 P.3d 1257 (citations omitted). The court will not look beyond
the statute's plain language unless the language is ambiguous. Id. (citations omitted).
The court presumes that the legislature used each word advisedly and gives effect to each
word according to its ordinary and accepted meaning. Id. (citations omitted).
By its plain language, the LRA did not do away with any claims for strict liability
or products liability. In fact, by its plain language, the LRA recognized strict liability and
products liability as viable causes of action. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(2)
("'Fault' means any actionable breach of legal duty . . . including . . . strict liability . . .
[and] products liability").
Butterfield Ford tries to get around the plain language of the statute by arguing that
the inclusion of the phrases "strict liability," "products liability" and others
in the definition of fault simply illustrates the Act's requirement that fault
be apportioned in those circumstances, not that fault means "negligence
. . . , comparative negligence, strict liability, breach of express or implied
warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification, or abuse
of a product."
(Br. of Aplee. at 12 (emphasis added).) Butterfield Ford's argument is directly contrary
to the plain language of the statute and the courts' interpretation of that language. See
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-27-37(2) ("'Fault* means . . . strict liability [ a n d ] . . . products

liability") (emphasis added); S.H. ex rel. Robinson v. Bistryski, 923 P.2d 1376, 1380
11

(Utah 1996) (section 78-27-37 "defines 'fault' to include strict liability"; "[b]y including
'strict liability' in the definition of fault, the legislature clearly intended comparative fault
principles to be applied to strict liability claims"). When a statute uses words that are
defined by the statute, they must be construed according to that specific and peculiar
definition. UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-11; Salt Lake City v. Roberts, 2002 UT 30, % 18, 44
P.3d 767; Utah State Bar v. Summerhayes & Hoyden, Public Adjusters, 905 P.2d 867,
871 (Utah 1995). The argument that the statutory definition of fault was meant only to
define the types of cases where fault can be apportioned but not to define "fault" itself is
not only contrary to this well-established canon of statutory construction but is also one of
those distinctions that Professor Williston used to say can be remembered just long
enough to be stated once. See Paul A. Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 81
HARV.L.REV.4,35(1967).

B.

The Legislative History of the LRA
Even if the statutory language were somehow unclear, that would not help

Butterfield Ford because the next step in construing an unclear statute is to consider its
legislative history. E.g., Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah 1998).
Butterfield Ford claims that the LRA was enacted as part of a nationwide tort
reform movement meant to address "the problem of holding nonmanufacturing, passive
distributors such as Butterfield Ford strictly liable for product defects." {See Br. of
Aplee. at 16-17.) Butterfield Ford has misrepresented the legislative history of the LRA.

12

The force behind the LRA was the Utah League of Cities and Towns, not any
nationwide consortium of passive retailers. The League of Cities and Towns was
concerned not with products liability actions but with tort suits in which a governmental
entity was a named defendant. The league was concerned that plaintiffs were looking at
governmental entities as deep pockets from which they could recover their entire
damages, even when the entity was only 10, 5 or 2 percent at fault. See Floor Debate on
Subst. S.B. 64, Utah Senate, 46th Leg., 1986 Gen. Sess., Feb. 12, 1986 (disk 63) (remarks
of David Spatafore); Tr. I.7 According to David Spatafore, director of governmental
affairs for the League of Cities and Towns, such a practice had "caused havoc with local
governments," many of whom were self-insured, and with their liability insurance. Id. A
self-insured city would have to pay any judgment out of tax dollars. Id.; Tr. 1-2. Thus,
the LRA was proposed as "a taxpayer[']s bill," not a retailer's bill. See Tr. 1.
Butterfield Ford cites the legislative history to show that the LRA was meant to
ensure that no defendant pay more than its "fair share" of damages. (Br. of Aplee. at 17-

7

A certified transcription of part of the Senate floor debate on Substitute S.B.
64 was made in 1989 and is available in the Office of the Utah Senate. For the court's
convenience, a copy of this transcript is included in the addendum. The corrections and
interlineations on the transcript are part of the certified transcription. References to the
transcript are to "Tr." and the page number.
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18.)8 That argument begs the question, however. The LRA says nothing about how a
passive retailer's "fair share" of damages is to be determined, other than to say that
[t]he trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury,
if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of
damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to
each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to any other person

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-27-39(1) (2002). In other words, the "fair share" of damages of a

defendant such as Butterfield Ford is a question of fact for the jury to decide, not a
question of law to be decided by the court on summary judgment.
The issue here is not whether the LRA was meant to ensure that no defendant pay
more than its share of liability or whether the LRA was meant to do away with joint and
several liability. The issue is whether the LRA was meant to alter the law of strict
products liability. Curiously, Butterfield Ford does not cite the legislative history
specifically dealing with this issue.
In the Senate floor debates, Senator Lyle Hilliard raised several questions. One
was whether the LRA would have any effect in the case of only one defendant. Stephen
Sorenson, Assistant Attorney General, confirmed that the LRA would have absolutely no

8

One of the pieces of legislative history that Butterfield Ford cites for this
proposition is the minutes of the Senate Standing Committee on State and Local Affairs
for January 27, 1986. Mr. Sanns has sought in vain for a copy of the minutes. He has
checked with the Utah Senate, the Utah State Archives, the Office of Legislative
Research and General Counsel, and Butterfield Ford's counsel, but none of them has a
copy of the minutes. However, the fact that the bill was considered by State and Local
Affairs and not by the Judiciary Committee, which considers changes to the Products
Liability Act, further shows that the bill was not a retailer's bill, as Butterfield Ford
claims, but a taxpayer's bill.
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impact in such a case. Tr. at 5.9 Thus, if Mr. Sanns had chosen to sue Butterfield Ford
alone, the LRA would not deprive him of his claim. See supra note 6.
Senator Hillyard then asked:
Now, there is another question I have in the bill and it's page 2, line 18,
actually 17 and 18 [the statutory definition of "fault"; see UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-27-37(2)]. I understand the word "fault" and that's negligence or not
doing what you're supposed to, and that's a normal negligent recovery. But
you used two terms in there that really concern me. One, on 17-18, is strict
liability. Now, if I understand the law correctly, strict liability generally has
nothing to do with fault at all, but yet you are using your definition and I
would feel very uncomfortable doing what you want to do, and let me say,
for the purpose of this thing, I represent defendants occasionally that get
nailed on this question of joint and several liability, and I am not adverse to
what you are trying to do, but I wonder if we are going broader than we
really want to with this bill. And I raise that question of strict liability, and
the next term, breach of express or implied warranty of a product. [. . .] I
could see liability being found against the city on strict liability with
absolutely nothing to do with fault because of public policy reasons.
See Floor Debate on Subst S.B. 64, Utah Senate, 46th Leg., 1986 Gen. Sess., Feb. 12,
1986 (disk 63); Tr. at 6. Mr. Sorenson responded:
[.. .] This is a comparative negligence statute. The law does not, or the bill
does not, I should say, change the substantive law of strict liability or
breach of warranty at all. What it says is ifyou have multiple defendants,
one of whom is guilty of negligence, one of whom is guilty of strict liability,
the jury in apportioning fault, apportions fault between those parties
regardless of the theory on which the party is liable. This is an issue with
which the Supreme Court struggled in the, I think it's the Mulherin case
[Mulherin v. Ingersoil-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981)], a couple of
years ago, and really hasn't known how to handle it, so we think that's a
good clarification that if you have differen[t] defendants guilty on different

9

The certified transcript mistakenly identifies "Steve" as "Steve Mecham."
See Tr. 5. According to the Senate Journal, it was Mr. Sorenson, not Mr. Mecham, who
addressed the Senate in the committee of the whole. See Utah Senate Journal, 46th
Legislature, Gen. Sess., at 583 (Feb. 12, 1986).
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theories of liability, nonetheless that's all considered fault for the purpose
of apportioning damages by the jury.
See id. (emphasis added). To which Senator Hillyard responded: "My experience has
been if there is strict liability found it is generally found period and you're not 10% or
20% or 50% at fault but strictly liable . . . . You're not even talking about percent, 10%
or 20% or 50%. You're talking about totally different concepts." Id. Mr. Sorenson
explained: "This would only affect that in the multiple defendant situation and then it
would make it possible for the jury to apportion fault among those parties. " Id.
(emphasis added).10 Senator Hillyard concluded, "I personally would feel much more
comfortable with the bill if we . . . were to strike those terms out, because I think they do
cause some confusion." Tr. at 6. Senator Hillyard's views, however, did not carry the
day.11 The bill passed with its definition of "fault" (including "strict liability" and
"products liability") intact.
C.

Utah Cases
The case law also does not support Butterfield Ford's construction of the LRA.
Admittedly, there is no Utah appellate decision directly on point. Nevertheless,

courts applying Utah law have continued to recognize the potential liability of a passive
10

Cf Mulherin, 628 P.2d at 1304 ("There may be semantic difficulties in
comparing strict liability and negligence, but we believe that judges and juries will have
no difficulty assigning the relative responsibility each is to bear for a particular injury
when the ultimate issues in such comparison are relative fault and relative causation").
11

Because of his concerns, Senator Hillyard wanted to refer the bill for
interim study, see Floor Debate on Subst. S.B. 64, Utah Senate, 46th Leg., 1986 Gen.
Sess., Feb. 12, 1986 (disk 63), and voted against the bill on the second reading, see Utah
Senate Journal, 46th Legislature, Gen. Sess., at 583 (Feb. 12, 1986).
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retailer even after the LRA took effect. See, e.g., Jackson v. Phillip Morris Inc., 46 F.
Supp. 2d 1217, 1229 (D. Utah 1998) (''under Utah strict products liability law, a plaintiff
may sue the distributor of an unreasonably dangerous product so long as the distributor is
sufficiently placed within the chain of distribution of the product from the manufacturer
to the ultimate consumer"); House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 555 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) (reversing summary judgment for a non-manufacturing distributor of a
bulletproof vest), affd, 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996). See also Robert A. McConnell,
Comment, Survey of Utah Strict Products Liability Law: From Hahn to the Present and
Beyond, 1992 BYU L. REV. 1173, 1175 ("there are indications that the [Utah Supreme]
[C]ourt would extend liability to the seller of a particular product even if the seller was
not the product's manufacturer"); 1176 ("the Utah court has implicitly acknowledged that
non-manufacturing sellers can be held liable under a strict products liability theory"; "the
court's silence on the matter indicates at least some implicit justification for holding nonmanufacturing sellers liable") (footnote omitted). Cf Richardson v. Navistar Intfl
Transp. Corp., 2000 UT 65,ffif3-9, 8 P.3d 263 (plaintiffs could pursue both negligence
claims against the owners and drivers of trucks involved in an accident and claims for
negligence and strict products liability against the manufacturers and sellers of vehicles
involved in the accident).
Butterfield Ford claims that Jackson actually supports its position because the
court in that case held that the plaintiffs had '"failed to show any sufficient basis for
bringing a strict products liability claim against' in-state distributors of cigarettes." (Br.
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of Aplee. at 24 (quoting 46 F. Supp. 2d at 1228).) The reason the plaintiffs' proof in
Jackson failed was because they had not proved that they had bought cigarettes from any
of the named Utah defendants, not because a passive retailer could not be liable as a
matter of law. See 46 F. Supp. 2d at 1229-30. In fact, the court specifically declined to
adopt the rule Butterfield Ford urges this court to adopt. See id. at 1229 n.5.
Butterfield Ford tries to distinguish House on the grounds that "a closer look at the
House decision reveals that it does not deal with a 'non-manufacturing seller of a
product/ as Plaintiff alleges/' but that the defendants in that case "were in the business of
'designing, manufacturing, testing and selling bullet-resistant vests.'" (Br. of Aplee. at 23
(quoting 886 P.2d at 545). Butterfield Ford needs to look at the case more closely. There
were three defendants in House—Armour of America, which designed, manufactured,
tested and sold vests; Lawco Police Supply, a retailer that sold the vests; and DuPont,
which developed, manufactured and sold the fiber used to weave the vests. The language
Butterfield Ford quotes from the court's opinion applied only to Armour, not to Lawco.
See 886 P.2d at 545. Armour affixed a label to the vests and prepared a brochure that it
included with the vests, which it then packaged in plastic. Lawco sold the packaged
vests. See id. at 545-46. The trial court granted summary judgment against all three
defendants. This court reversed as to both Armour and Lawco, holding that both could be
strictly liable under section 402A for failing to adequately warn Lt. House of the
limitations and capabilities of the vest. See id. at 547, 555.
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Other Utah cases also refute Butterfield Ford's argument that the LRA requires a
defendant to be at "fault" in the traditional sense (that is, be negligent) in order to have
some liability apportioned to him under the LRA. In S.H. ex rel. Robinson v. Bistryski,
923 P.2d 1376, 1381 (Utah 1996), the court held that the LRA applied to strict liability
claims under Utah's dog-bite statute, section 18-1-1 of the Utah Code. The court
affirmed in part a verdict apportioning fault to the owner of a dog and the parent of a
child bitten by the dog after the parent dropped her negligence claim against the dog
owner and proceeded solely under a theory of strict liability. See 923 P.2d at 1378.
Similarly, in Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, 2000 UT 22, 996 P.2d 540, the court
held that the Dramshop Liability Act, section 32A-14-101 of the Utah Code (renumbered
section 32A-14a-102), was subject to the LRA, even though the dramshop act "prescribes
a form of strict liability rather than traditional negligence." 2000 UT 22, % 10 (per
Russon, J., with Zimmerman, J., concurring). The court overruled Reeves v. Gentile, 813
P.2d 111 (Utah 1991), which had held that principles of comparative fault did not apply
as between different dramshops contributing to the same injury. The court said that, "to
the extent Reeves based its holding upon the premise that strict liability cannot be
included in comparative fault calculations, that holding is rebutted by the plain language
of the comparative fault statute and our subsequent decision in Bistryski. " 2000 UT 22, ^
11. Chief Justice Howe concurred "reluctantly." Id. f 14 (Howe, C.J., concurring). He
was not sure that the legislature intended to dilute the strict liability of the dramshop act
but felt "constrained by the language of sections 78-27-37(2) and 78-27-37(3) [the LRA's
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definitions of "fault" and "person immune from suit/' respectively] to apply those
sections in this dramshop case." Id.
If there was any doubt as to whether the LRA implicitly overruled Utah's adoption
of section 402A, it was erased by the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in Schaerrer
v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 2003 UT 43, 79 P.3d 922, decided three weeks before
Butterfield Ford filed its brief but not cited in that brief. The court in that case reaffirmed
section 402A, as adopted in Hahn. See 2003 UT 43, % 16. The court then stated the
elements of a claim under section 402A:
We have since applied section 402A to require that in order to recover on
strict liability against a seller, the plaintiff must prove (1) that a defect or
defective condition of the product made it unreasonably dangerous, (2) that
the defect was present at the time of the product's sale, and (3) that the
defective condition was the cause of the plaintiffs injuries.
Id. (citing Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah 1996)). For purposes
of Butterfield Ford's motion for summary judgment and this appeal, none of these
elements are disputed. Significantly, the court did not say that a plaintiff must also prove
that the seller was negligent or that the seller was also the designer or manufacturer of the
product or otherwise responsible for the defect.
D.

Cases from Other Jurisdictions
None of the cases from other jurisdictions that Butterfield Ford relies on supports

its argument. In fact, they show that, when legislatures have intended to immunize
passive retailers from claims of strict products liability, they have done so by express
language to that effect, not by merely doing away with joint and several liability. In all
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but one of the cases, the court applied a statute that expressly does what the LRA does not
expressly do-that is, limits claims for strict products liability to manufacturers of
products or negligent retailers.12 See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab.
Litig., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1152 & n.5 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (applying Ga. Code Ann. §§
51-1-11 and -11.1, which exempt a non-manufacturing "product seller" from strict
products liability); Schneider v. Tri Star MX Inc., 476 S.E.2d 846, 847-48 (Ga. Ct. App.
1996) (same), cert, denied (Ga. 1997); Alltrade, Inc. v. McDonald, 445 S.E.2d 856, 85758 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (same); Zehner v. Nodskog Indus., Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-2508,
1992 WL 233984 (E.D. La. Sept. 2, 1992) (applying La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:2800.52 &
9:2800.53(1), which limit claims for strict products liability to a "manufacturer" as
defined in the statute); Matthews v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 708 So.2d 1248, 1249 (La. Ct.
App.) (same), writ denied, 720 So.2d 681 (La. 1998); Liesener v. Weslo, Inc., 775 F.
Supp. 857, 859 (D. Md. 1991) (applying former Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-

12

The only other case Butterfield Ford cites, Mask v. Chrysler Corp., 825 F.
Supp. 285 (N.D. Ala. 1993), aff'd, 29 F.3d 641 (11th Cir. 1994) (table), was actually two
cases. The court found that a local dealership had been fraudulently joined to prevent
removal to federal court because, in one of the cases, the plaintiffs attorney had admitted
that he did not think the dealer was at fault and did not intend to pursue a claim against
the dealer to judgment, and, in the other case, the plaintiff had not bought the car from the
defendant dealerships and the dealerships had never worked on the car while the plaintiff
owned it, so the plaintiffs had no legitimate claim against the dealerships. 825 F. Supp. at
288-90. Here, it is undisputed that Butterfield Ford sold the van in question, and Mr.
Sanns has consistently claimed that Butterfield Ford was at fault and has continually
pursued his claim against Butterfield Ford. The court in Mask did not rule that the
adoption of comparative fault in Alabama immunized passive retailers from liability,
since Alabama has not adopted comparative fault; contributory negligence is still a
complete defense in Alabama. See, e.g., H.R.H. Metals, Inc. v. Miller ex rel Miller, 833
So.2d 18, 28 (Ala. 2002) (Houston, J., concurring specially).
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311(b), now § 5-405(b), which immunizes a seller from strict liability claims where the
seller did not manufacture or alter the product, did not know of the defect and could not
have discovered it in the exercise of reasonable care); Funk v. Wagner Mach., Inc., 710
S.W.2d 860, 862 (Ky. Ct App. 1986) (applying Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.340, which
immunizes a retailer from liability if the manufacturer is identified and subject to the
court's jurisdiction and the retailer sold the product in its original manufactured
condition, unless the retailer knew or should have known of the defective condition). In
each of these cases, the passive retailer was held not liable because there was a state
statute that expressly said it could not be liable.
Significantly, Butterfield Ford has not cited any case from a jurisdiction that has a
comparative fault statute like Utah's that defines "fault" to include strict liability and
products liability. The comparative fault acts of at least eleven jurisdictions in addition to
Utah define "fault" to include "strict liability," "products liability" or conduct that would
give rise to or subject one to strict or products liability. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.900
(Lexis 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506(F)(2) (West 2003); 735 I I I . COMP.
STAT. ANN.

5/2-1116(b) (West Supp. 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.1(1) (West 1998);

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.

§ 600.6304(8) (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01

subdiv. la (West 2000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(1) (Lexis 1999); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-1-705(9) (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.2-01 & -02 (1996); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.22.015 (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § l-l-109(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2003). Significantly,
none of these jurisdictions has construed its comparative fault statute to preclude the strict
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products liability of a so-called passive retailer. In those jurisdictions that have so limited
the liability of passive retailers, they have done so by specific provisions in their products
liability acts, not simply by doing away with joint and several liability. See 735 I I I .
COMP. STAT. ANN.

5/2-621; IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.18; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.41;

N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-04 (Supp. 2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.040. Utah's
Product Liability Act contains no such limitation. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-1
through -7 (2002). In other jurisdictions without such provisions in their products
liability acts, passive retailers continue to be liable in strict products liability. See, e.g.,
Norton v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 878 F. Supp. 902, 906-07 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
In short, in every jurisdiction in which a passive retailer is not liable as a matter of
law, it is because the jurisdiction's product liability act expressly so provides. In no
jurisdiction that the parties have found has the mere abolition of joint and several liability
been held to immunize a passive retailer from strict products liability.
E.

Policy Considerations
The cases Butterfield Ford cites not only do not support its position, but some of

them show why public policy supports the continued strict products liability of product
sellers absent some express legislation to the contrary.
For example, m Matthews v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 708 So.2d 1248 (La. Ct. App.),
writ denied, 720 So.2d 681 (La. 1998), mdAlltrade, Inc. v. McDonald, 445 S.E.2d 856
(Ga. Ct. App. 1994), the plaintiffs were injured by products manufactured in China and
Taiwan, respectively. They sued the American distributors of the products but were left
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without any remedy because the products liability acts of the respective states limited
products liability claims to manufacturers. The distributors had not manufactured the
products, and the manufacturers were beyond the courts' jurisdiction. It was to avoid
such hurdles to recovery for injuries caused by defective products that the doctrine of
strict products liability developed in the first place. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 98 (5th ed. 1984).

It is now generally recognized that a manufacturer or even a dealer has a
responsibility to the ultimate consumer, based upon nothing more than the
sufficient fact that he has so dealt with the goods that they are likely to
come into the hands of another, and to do harm if they are defective.
Id. § 96, at 682 (emphasis added and footnote omitted). Sound policy supports dealer
liability:
The goal of accident prevention is best served by the imposition of
strict liability on the retailer. Such liability will induce care in the selection
of manufacturers who are responsible both in (a) designing and constructing
safe products, and (b) in providing financial security for those victimized by
dangerously defective products. Finally, victims of dangerously defective
products will be relieved of the difficult burden of proving when, in the
marketing chain, a defect originated.
Id. § 100, at 707.
If the court were to hold that the LRA immunizes a passive retailer from liability,
then people injured by defective products would no longer be able to look to the person
whose judgment, skill and reputation they relied on in purchasing the product and who
benefits from its sale—the dealer. Instead, they would be forced in many instances to
pursue claims against foreign or unknown manufacturers. If the legislature intends such a
change in the law, it should say so clearly. The LRA clearly shows that the legislature
24

did not intend to do away with any claims for "strict" or "products" liability. See UTAH
CODE ANN.

§78-27-37(2).

CONCLUSION
There were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Butterfield Ford acted
reasonably in distributing a defective van without adequate warnings of its propensity to
roll over. Butterfield Ford can also be liable in strict products liability, regardless of any
negligence on its part. The court should therefore reverse the summary judgment in favor
of Butterfield Ford and remand this case to Third District Court for further proceedings.
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46TH LEGISLATURE
Senate Bill 64, Floor Debates, February 12, 1986

Disk 63 Gs^e- 0
President:

This is, Senate Bill 64. It's been read in. Senator Barlow?

Senator Barlow:
Secretary:

Have we adopted the Committee's report on that?

We did yesterday.

Senator Barlow:

Oh, thank you very much.

Senator Barlow: Mr. President, I and members of the Senate, I don't know of any bill
coming before this session of the legislature which is going to affect so many people
as this bill right here is, favorably that is. And in order to give you a background, I
would move, if it is alright, that we have a committee M «a whole, I would like to have
RC Dave (fnsbcit) take a little time to give you the background, you mighi want to ask
him some questions. If we'll do that, then we will go right into the bill afterward.
President:
"aye".
Senate:

Motion to resolve the bill as a committee a£^a. whole, those in favor say

Aye.

President:

Opposed, "no".

President: Motion carried. Please come forward to the microphone.
Mr. Fssfcfcrt: Thank you Mr. President, Senator Barlow, members of the Senate. It
gives me a great honor to be here today to speak with you concerning Senate Bill 64.
As Senator Barlow mentioned, this is probably one of the most important pieces of
legislation that you will be debating in this session. Because coming from the Utah
League of Cities and Towns, who I represent, this is not an insurance bill, as some of
the opponents claim it to be. This is a taxpayers bill. The reason it's a taxpayers bill
is because right now our tort system is, we follow a doctrine of joint and several
liability. In layman's terms what joint and several liability means is if you have a
plaintiff who sues a number of defendants and one of those defendants may be a
government or city and they find that city 5 or 10% liable, the doctrine of joint and
several liability means that plaintiff can get the entire award from that government for
his damages.
Then it's up to that government, in subsequent trials, to sue for
collection from the other defendants. We don't think that's fair; we don't think that's
equitable; and we believe that Senate Bill 64 will resolve that problem of joint and
several liability. Speaking from government, we're not against paying our fair share if
one of our cities causes an accident or is partially liable for the fault of an accident.
We believe that's equitable. But for a plaintiff to go after the entire amount from a
deep pocket local government, we think that's unequitable, unfair and it caused havoc
with local governments and our liability insurance. Many local governments and the
state of government now sued are self-insured. What that means is if we don't pass
Senate Bill 64 and if local governments have claims filed against them for an excessive
amount of damages and the city is found to be 5% liable, 2% liable, whatever it is,
then that city is going to have to pay the entire award, not some insurance company

in Hartford, Connecticut, but the city out of tax dollars that you and I pay. The
League of Cities, under Senator Barlow's direction has passed out a four-page fact
sheet. We'd like you to go through that. I am sure some of the debate can center
around that. If there are any questions on that, I would like to answer. But right
before we vote, we've handed out a one-sheet, a half letter, and it's from Go West
Magazine. That's a magazine of truckers in California. I highlighted two paragraphs
for you, and I'll read them. I am sure you have all read or heard about the problems
arising from tort liability. To date, Cal-Trans, and Cal-Trans is the California
equivalent of UDOT, is facing three billion dollars, not million but billion, of legal
claims. That's because the state is a so-called deep pocket, and anyone who has an
accident for any reason on a California state highway makes sure that Cal-Trans is
included in the lawsuit simply because they know that they can collect from Cal-Trans.
Essentially, that's all I wanted to say in my remarks. I would love to respond to
questions or comments and I appreciate being with you.
President: Any questions? Senator Swan?
Senator Swan: Yeah, Dave have you discussed any kind of middle ground or is there
any kind of middle ground? Because, you know, I think the statements have been
made in some of the material we've received, that if the cities don't back up a claim
by the deep-pocket's consideration, there will be nobody else to help the victim . . .
You've indicated that it is obviously a very inappropriate situation to have everybody
suing the transit system. That's going to the extreme. But is there any kind of
middle ground there, dividing the remaining cause of liability or something of that . . .
Mr. Fasbert: That's a good question Senator. To answer, my first part of the answer,
I'd like you to turn to the third page of the four-page handout that's labeled Utah
League of Cities and Towns Fact Sheet that was handed out either this morning or
yesterday, and Item 5 is headed Why There is a Substitute Bill. The reason for that
Senator is Items A through D were initially included in Senate Bill 64 but because of
seven hours of debate in senate, state and local, were taken out because we were
trying to reach the middle ground with the plaintiff's attorney, I won't go into those
four items. The second point I'd like to mention is in the State of Minnesota. One of
the things the plaintiff's attorneys have talked about was the Minnesota plan, and
Minnesota was a middle ground. We called back to the League of Cities in Minnesota;
they responded back to us saying yes, we have a middle ground, but right now again,
after we passed the bill four months ago, we're back in the Minnesota legislature
trying to do exactly what we're trying to do in Utah. There's no middle ground on
joint and several liability. You either think it's a good doctrine or you don't. The
h
1 third response to that, the plaintiff's attorney, and yes they play a very good role in
, a r ^f\our society in terms of helping the plaintiff^ . . .,* Uiey claim that if a deep-pocket
' ^
isn't there to pay those damages, they won't get paI3. I would venture to say that
i/^°l
first of all, most defendants in a lawsuit are not financially insolvent. In other words,
there'll be people with insurance who cause the accident and the insurance company
will pay . . . . What we're trying to do is make the government prevent us from being
the deep-pocket. So, in terms of middle ground on the bill, we feel wc have given on
four very crucial points. In terms of middle ground on joint and several, unfortunately
there isn't any.
Senator Swan: Has anyone considered some kind of an insurance bond for those who
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are not financially in a position to have the coverage, or do not have the coverage as
kind of a backup, a catastrophic situation.
Mr. Fa$bert: For government?
Senator Swan: Yes.
Mr. Fa£be*t. There are two forms of insurance for government.
insurance and what we call the reinsurance. . .

The regular liability

Senator Swan: Well, no, 1 guess I am really thinking in terms of some kind of a state
fund to cover the liability of some of these cases where we could go with your
concept Dave, and pass it, but then back it up with some kind of a state effort so
that in those cases where the liability was there, but there wasn't any kind of
insurance coverage, that there might be some kind of a backup. Fm just trying to
think of some way to protect the person.
Mr. Fnsbeit: We appreciate the possibility of having a fund, however, you know in
your budget you are having a hard time balancing the budget this year. I don't know
where that fund would be.
Senator Swan: You're not aware of any states having . . .
S
Mr. Fasbett: No. We researched that during the interim because we thought that
might be an alternative and there just isn't one like that.
President: Senator Bunnell?
Senator Bunnell: Dave, in this substitute bill, did you take out the provisions of what
the jury should do and what the judge should do? I can't see it in the green copy.
5
Mr. fttsfeert: Yes, what we did on jury instructions, Senator, is the bill we have in
front of you is left silent. And what we've done is we have just agreed to go with
the existing case law, and the case law is that essentially the judge will instruct the
jury as to what their decisions and what their awards mean. That's one of the
concessions that we made. ULJ*~ c i ; < w t u j a n r ~vo lei- TKOJV (vievofe) 0^
^*-Y%DC*>KO
v*/Vo ~V^\«~ ^ u a M ^ u~^~ ^ ^ ^ O\O.O"V^J^^ ccVTpg K^e^^-'VV>cx,r u o a . 3 o^^
0 ^ t v i Issw?
President: Senator Overson? -\\*£H u^e^e v^e.«AV^ s t u w c ^ ov^> c ^ d "i-Wccf UJQ^S o^e, CA^
Senator Overson: Yes. In your handout Fact Sheet, I guess it's on the third page,
Why There is a Substitute Bill, Part D, Failure to Use Available Safety Devices, are
you saying that there was a section in there which was deleted which is now not
deleted?
Mr. Fasbe*t: No. In the original Senate Bill 64, Senator, there was a definition of
defendant, and essentially what the definition included was that if the defendant failed
to use any available safety devices, that information could be outlined to the jury and
his award reduced that amount based on his own negligence.
Senator Overson: So, you took that out?
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Mr. Fastest: That's taken out, so the defendants in the case could not argue that the
plaintiff should have used the seat belt, should have used a hard hat, or anything like
that. That was one of the other concessions that the cities and towns gave to the
plaintiff's bar.
President: Senator Matheson?
Senator Matheson: Mr. President, the question I'd like to answer, I need/to make a
statement, so it will clarify what I am getting at. A number of years u*-~ ago, if a
city or a county were sued under a claim, and they did not have insurance adequate to
cover it, then they were required to levy a mill levy to the maximum of the statutory
limit for whatever period of time it took to cover that claim. Is that correct?
Mr. Fasbci t: Yes sir.
Senator Matheson: Does that still stand at this point?

6
Mr. Fasbe**: I am not sure, but if a city, a county can't do this, but if a city was
levied a claim against it so large that they didn't have the reserves to pay, they have
either two options: raise the taxes to pay or disincorporate.
Senator Matheson: But if they were to their statutory limit, this could spread out
over a long period.
Mr. -Farsteert: Oh, absolutely. « •
Senator Matheson: Now, this is the problem is it not that faces cities and counties
now that are going uninsured. If they had a mammoth claim come against them that
had to be settled, if in fact they couldn't cover it with funds they had, then they
must levy to the maximum of the statutory limit for whatever period of time it takes
to pay that off.
President: Senator Hillyard?
Senator Hillyard: That raises some questions;Dave, and I certainly don't intend to be
a tricky lawyer^C^ I appreciate the fact that nobody likes lawyers. I bring my kids
down here and they get a real laugh out of how everybody hates lawyers. But, let me
ask you a couple of questions. I really want to know the answers. Senator Matheson
raised the question about how much the taxes would be raised and I am glad to see
Steve's here because I know he wouldn't answer as a lawyer.
Mr. Fasbert: That's why Steve's up here, you know for the legal answers I'm going to
have to defer . . .
Senator Hillyard: I thought in the Governmental Immunity, Steve, that we put caps on
certain amounts that you could recover against a municipality and government, and so,
if I were say to get a $100,000,000.00 verdict, the municipality or the state would only
have to respond to that statutory limit. Isn't that correct? On a general tort case.
Stevcp That's true with some important qualifications. Over the past five years, the
Utah Supreme Court has pretty radically redefined what a governmental function is
that is covered by the Immunity Act, and it still is an unknown question until it gets
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to the court whether those liability limits apply to what the court would define as
non-governmental functions.
That's one question.
Another question I suppose is
whether the courts will find those constitutionally permissible. I am aware of at least
one major case now where the court has granted an interlocutory appeal which, as you
know, is fairly rarely done, to consider that very question. So, the answer I guess is
yes, but with some important qualifications that really make the issue doubtful in our
minds.
>
Senator Hillyard: My concern, let me follow that up.
I know Representative
McKwfcey and I met with you and I thought that we had worked out some language to
really limit the area of liability. N < w k was your concern, I know they were House
bills, they passed the legislature, Mr.^ffistein was involved, I know you were involved,
and I had thought that we had closed all of those doors. Obviously, you can't close
every one, but we had really tightened that up, so that we were within the insurance
limits. What are those limits?
Steve: I believe they were 100/300, that is $100,000 per person, $300,000 per occurrence.
In 1983 they were changed to 250/500, and let me just say about the previous
bills. We thought we had tagged that down pretty good and then in a subsequent case,
the Dal ton case, I think versus Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary District, something like
that, the court zeroed in, not on that particular section, but on a very closely related
section, the one year statute of limitation after the claim has been denied, and said
this h not a governmental function, therefore, does not arise under the Act, therefore,
that procedural bar does not apply. So that really leaves us in doubt, as much as we
thought we had buttoned the question down, whether we have successfully or not.
Senator Hillyard: But if I am correct, this bill then would have no impact if we moved
out of the distinction between governmental and non-governmental function and the
city alone was acting.
Steve: I am not sure if I follow your question.
Senator Hillyard: Well, my question is, is the distinction you make here of governmental and non-governmental, and I hope I am not boring everyone because I am really
talking about some important legislative issues, legal issues, and I think people need to
understand before they vote on this bill, but if the Supreme Court decides an issue is
non-governmental, so it is not covered by the Governmental Immunity statute and these
limitations we put on, then in all likelihood, the community would be fully liable,
whatever the amount.
Steve:

Yes, that's right.

Senator Hillyard: This bill would have no impact on it.
Steve: Bill 64 would apply across the board, governmental, non-governmental
function . . .
Senator Hillyard: So, if it were the city alone, this bill would have absolutely no
impact, absolutely none.
Steve:

Right.
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Senator Hillyard: Now, there is another question I have in the bill and it's page 2,
line 18, actually 17 and 18. 1 understand the word "fault" and that's negligence or not
doing what you're supposed to, and that's a normal negligent recovery. But you used
two terms in there that really concern me. One, on 17-18, is strict liability. Now, if
I understand the law correctly, strict liability generally has nothing to do with fault at
all, but yet you are using your definition and I would feel very uncomfortable doing
what you want to do, and let me say, for the purpose of this thing, I represent
defendants occasionally that get nailed on this question of joint and several liability,
and I am not adverse to what you are trying to do, but I wonder if we are going
broader than we really want to with this bill. And I raise that question of strict
liability, and the next term, breach of express or implied warranty of a product. I
could see liability being found against the city on strict liability with absolutely
nothing to do with fault because of public policy reasons.
Steve: This is a comparative negligence statute. The law does not, or the bill does
not, I should say, change the substantive law of strict liability or breach of warranty
at all. What it says is if you have multiple defendants, one of whom is guilty of
negligence, one of whom is guilty of strict liability, the jury in apportioning fault,
apportions fault between those parties regardless of the theory on which the party is
liable. This is an issue with which the Supreme Court struggled in the, I think it's
the Mulherin case, a couple of years ago, and really hasn't known how to handle it, so
we think that's a good clarification that if you have difference defendants guilty on
different theories of liability, nonetheless that's all considered fault for the purpose of
apportioning damages by the jury.
Senator Hillyard: My experience has been if there is strict liability found it is
generally found period and you're not 10% or 20% or 50% at fault but strictly liable.
You're not even talking about percent, 10% or 20% or 50%. You're talking about
totally different concepts.
Steve: This would only affect that in the multiple defendant situation and then it
would make it possible for the jury to apportion fault among those parties.
Senator Hillyard: I personally would feel much more comfortable with the bill if we,
of course this is only the second reading I must finish up again, if we were to strike
those terms out, because I think they do cause some confusion . . .

^ ( / / f ^ o a l
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